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GAMES OF LOVE AND HATE
Debraj Ray r© Rajiv Vohra†
March 2019
Forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy
Abstract. A strategic situation with payoff-based externalities is one in which a player’s payoff depends
on her own action and (continuously) on the payoffs of other players. Every action profile therefore in-
duces an interdependent utility system. If each utility system is bounded, with a unique payoff solution
for every action profile, we call the strategic situation coherent, and if the same condition also applies
to every subset of players, we call the situation sub-coherent. A coherent and sub-coherent situation
generates a standard normal form, referred to as a game of love and hate. Our central theorem states
that every equilibrium of a game of love and hate is Pareto optimal, in sharp contrast to the general
prevalence of inefficient equilibria in the presence of externalities. While externalities are restricted
to flow only through payoffs there are no other constraints: they could be positive or negative, or of
varying sign. We further show that our coherence, sub-coherence and continuity requirements are tight.
1. INTRODUCTION
A strategic situation with payoff-based externalities is one in which the payoff of each player depends
on her own action, and the payoffs of some or all of the other players. Others’ actions enter a player’s
payoff only via the payoffs they generate for other players.
Payoff-based externalities are, of course, natural in situations of altruism or envy (see, for example,
Pearce 1983, Ray 1987, Bergstrom 1999, Kockesen, Ok and Sethi 2000, Kimball 1987, or Vasquez
and Weretka 2018). In its purest form, we might derive our happiness or hatred directly from the
extent to which others are enjoying themselves, and not from how they are doing so. But payoff-based
externalities also occur in situations in which there is no love or hate as such, but there are pecuniary
externalities generated by firm profits, say, via demand (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989), or in which
the payoffs of others serve as reference points or aspirations for an individual (Genicot and Ray 2017).
The interacting cascade generated by interdependent payoff functions can get out of hand, leading to
implosions or explosions of utility, or multiple utility solutions for some fixed action profile. Familiar
Hawkins-Simon-like conditions guarantee coherence; i.e., a bounded utility system with unique solution
for every action profile (Pearce 1983, Hori and Kanaya 1989, Bergstrom 1999). This paper directly
imposes coherence, as well as coherence on all subsets of agents (“sub-coherence”). We also assume
that the payoff of each player is continuous in the payoffs of others. Then the strategic situation can
be reduced to a standard game with payoffs defined on action profiles. We call this a game of love and
hate. We have just one main result to report:
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2Every equilibrium of a game of love and hate is Pareto-optimal.
The purpose of our paper is to state, prove and discuss this theorem. It is worth mentioning here that
this result is independent of the sign of the externalities. “Love” creates full efficiency — despite the
fears of a coordination failure, but so does “hate,” and so does any mixture of the two — a player could
hate some individuals and love others, or indeed could love and hate the same individual at different
points on the domain of her payoff function. This result appears to depend fundamentally — but only
— on the presumption that all externalities are transmitted via payoffs.
But a bit more is involved. One is naturally drawn to explaining just why games such as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma or the Coordination Game, with inefficient equilibria, cannot be written as strategic situations
with payoff-based externalities. The answer is that they can be so written (see Theorem 3), but no
matter which payoff function we use to represent that conversion, either coherence or continuity must
fail. Since the connection between coherence and efficiency is far from obvious, this leads to a new and
more subtle interpretation of the coherence restriction.
This discussion should not be taken to mean that we believe Nash equilibria to be efficient, or even
efficient “most of the time.” Our result is general, but it is general within the particular class of games
of love and hate. Such games do have applications (see Section 3), but our aim is not to argue that this
class is widespread, or to provide algorithms to verify that a game belongs to this class. What we do
find interesting is the fact that equilibria of games of love and hate behave the way they do. In particular,
we are drawn to the philosophical implications of our efficiency theorem, knowing well as we do that
Nash equilibria of games with externalities are “typically” Pareto-suboptimal.
For instance, a common and obvious criticism of the libertarian doctrine is that when externalities
are involved, behavior in accordance with libertarian philosophy can lead to Pareto-inferior outcomes
(Sen 1970). Of course, we agree with this position. It is nevertheless of some interest that when all
externalities are “non-paternalistic,” in the sense of being transmitted entirely via payoffs, a libertarian
cannot but be a Paretian.1
2. THE SETTING
The set of agents is N “ t1, . . . nu. Each agent i P N has a strategy set Xi. Let X “śiXi. For each
i, utility ui depends on her own action xi, and on all other utilities u´i ” tujuj‰i:
(1) ui “ fipxi, u´iq.
A collection pN, tXi, fiuq is a strategic situation with payoff-based externalities (or a strategic situation,
for short). It is continuous if for each i and strategy xi, fi is continuous in u´i. Except in Section 6, no
continuity condition is imposed with respect to xi; in fact, no topological restrictions are placed on X .
Define the function f : X ˆ IRN Ñ IRN by:2
fpx, uq “ f1px1, u´1q ˆ . . .ˆ fipxi, u´iq ˆ . . .ˆ fnpxn, u´nq.
1See also Bergstrom (1970) in the special context of a distributive Lindahl equilibrium with non-malevolent agents and,
for a somewhat different perspective, Green (1982), (2003).
2For S Ď N , IRS denotes |S|-dimensional Euclidean space with coordinates indexed by members of S.
3For any x, the mapping fpx, ¨q is an instance of an interdependent utility system, governed by n compo-
nent equations fipx, ¨q, where for every i, the component fi that generates ui is defined on the vector of
other payoffs u´i. As Pearce (1983), Kimball (1987), Bergstrom (1999), Vasquez and Weretka (2018)
and others have observed, this interdependent system could pose several analytical difficulties.
First, the system may have no solution. To borrow an example from Pearce (1983), suppose that there
are two players, and for some x, we have
fipx, u´iq “ 1` u´i for i “ 1, 2.
Then there is no solution to this interdependent utility system.
It’s also possible that the system admits multiple solutions. Consider a two-person example from
Vasquez and Weretka (2018), where
fipx, u´iq “ ?u´i for i “ 1, 2,
so that there are two solutions: u “ p0, 0q and u “ p1, 1q. This reflects a situation in which two
people who love each other could both be either happy or unhappy. Or one could generate asymmetric
multiplicities; for instance, in situations with intense antipathy. Multiple solutions at some action profile
make it impossible to unambiguously pin down the payoffs for that profile.
Finally, even if there is a unique solution, there may be cascades of self-reinforcing echoes that amplify
without bound. In other words, the solution may be “unstable” in the sense that a small departure from
it will cause payoffs to explode. Drawing on Pearce (1983) and Bergstrom (1989), suppose that there
are two players, and
fipx, u´iq “ xi ` 2u´i for i “ 1, 2.
Then
(2) ui “ ´xi ` 2x´i
3
is the unique solution to the system, but it is an absurd solution. In the words of Pearce (1983), slightly
adjusted for notation: “although the functions seem to indicate that the individuals enjoy x1 and x2 and
are mutually sympathetic, the reduced form indicates that both u1 and u2 are increased when x1 or x2 is
decreased! This does not correspond to any plausible dynamic adjustment story, such as the following.
If x1 is reduced by 1 unit, this should ‘initially’ lower u1 by 1, which would then cause u2 to fall 2 units,
diminishing u1 by a further 4 units. This downward spiral does not converge . . . such a counter-intuitive
state of affairs might be called instability.”
We don’t mean to dismiss any of these cases out of hand, and in our discussion below we will argue
for an entirely different perspective on such matters. For now, we only wish to consider those strategic
situations that are well-behaved in the sense of not being plagued by the problems above. These are
situations which can be unambiguously converted into a well-defined game, with a unique and “stable”
vector of payoffs at every action profile. This is exactly the case considered by Pearce, Bergstrom
and others, and as shall see, it yields a remarkable conclusion on the efficiency of equilibria. This
result, in turn, will shed some new light on the cases above, once we consider standard normal-form
cases and attempt to “work backwards” to their representation as a strategic situation with payoff-based
externalities. With these considerations in mind, say that a strategic situation is coherent if for every x,
4(i) [boundedness] there is Bpxq ă 8 such that ‖fpx, uq‖ ă ‖u‖ whenever ‖u‖ ą Bpxq, where ‖¨‖ is
the sup norm;
(ii) [uniqueness] the mapping fpx, ¨q has a unique fixed point.
Indeed, we also ask for “sub-coherence” on every sub-situation generated by holding fixed the payoffs
to a subset S of players, say at u¯S . That is, for every action profile txjujPN´S , we impose coherence
on the resulting utility system on player set N ´ S given by fipxi, uN´S´i, u¯Sq, for i P N ´ S.
Of course, sufficient conditions for coherence can be provided. Pearce (1983), Hori and Kanaya (1989),
and Bergstrom (1999) do so. For instance, Pearce (1983) considers the special case of “mutual sympa-
thy,” placing bounds on the extent to which uj affects ui; these emerge as a Hawkins-Simon condition
on the matrix of cross-derivatives. His conditions guarantee both (i) and (ii) above. Or one could
presume — mutual sympathy or not — that the f -mapping is a contraction for each action profile.
Or assume that for each action profile, the associated directed network of payoff interdependencies is
acyclic, and that payoff functions are bounded. That, too, will generate coherence.
Note that coherence is a “robust property”: for instance, in the class of all differentiable interdependent
utility systems, a perturbation of the Pearce sufficient conditions will still yield coherence. (To be sure,
the lack of coherence is robust as well; neither coherence nor the lack of it is “generic.”) Note, moreover,
that any of the above sufficient conditions for coherence will also imply sub-coherence.
“No explosions” and “uniqueness” are independent restrictions. For instance, the former (but not the
latter) would follow immediately if we assume that f is bounded, as in Vasquez and Weretka (2018).
Our third example above shows that uniqueness can coexist with lack of boundedness.
Coherence is our starting point. Without it we may be unable to unambiguously assign a utility profile
to a profile of actions. With it, we can: fpx, .q has a unique fixed point for every strategy profile
x. Thus a strategic situation generates a well-defined normal form game with payoffs Upxq, where
Upxq “ fpx, Upxqq.3 We will refer to a normal form game generated by a coherent, sub-coherent and
continuous strategic situation as a game of love and hate.
The following definitions are standard. A strategy profile x˚ is a Nash equilibrium (or simply equilib-
rium) if for every i and action xi,
Uipx˚q ě Uipxi, x˚´ iq.
A strategy profile x P X is Pareto optimal or efficient if there does not exist x1 P X withUpx1q ą Upxq.4
3. APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES
Beginning with Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949), there has been increasing interest in studying
economic agents who obtain payoffs (altruistic or invidious) from the well-being of others. Several stud-
ies emphasize the relativistic nature of happiness or individual welfare, among them Easterlin (1974),
Frank (1985, 1989), Clark and Oswald (1996), Ray and Robson (2012), and many others. These papers
typically emphasize invidious comparisons.
3We use upper case U to denote the utility function for the normal form game and lower case u for payoff values.
4For vectors a and b, “a ě b” means ai ě bi in every component, “a ą b” implies a ě b and a ‰ b, and “a " b” means
ai ą bi in every component.
5There is a also large literature on altruism; for a small sample, see, e.g. Strotz (1955), Phelps and Pollak
(1968), Ray (1987), Andreoni (1989), Galperti and Strulovici (2017), and of course the references to
Pearce, Bergstrom, Kimball and others already cited. One standard formulation presumes that individ-
uals are affected by some measure of the economic standing of others, such as their income, wealth or
consumption. But a subset of this literature also emphasizes a “non-paternalistic” formulation in which
individuals care — positively or negatively — about the payoffs of other individuals. It is common in
macroeconomics, for instance, to interpret the value functions of dynamic programming as intergener-
ational altruism; see, for instance, Barro (1974) or Loury (1981). This is not to suggest that all models
of interpersonal externalities are profitably written in this way. We may envy or admire the economic
positions of others rather than the payoffs that are derived from them. But there are other situations
where the non-paternalistic approach is more relevant, and those are the ones we seek to study here.
For instance, and apart from the above interpretation of dynamic programming, the foundations of
modern welfare economics laid down by Bergson and Samuelson rely on a non-paternalistic form of
interpersonal sympathy. While Bergson’s notion of a social welfare function is usually seen as a useful
device for studying Pareto optimality in an economy without externalities, Samuelson (1981) shows how
this idea extends to the case of non-paternalistic agents with sympathy or envy towards others. Suppose
each agent has a “private” or “first-level” utility function that depends only on her own consumption
of goods. A non-paternalistic agent who does care about others can then be modeled as one having a
“final” or “second-level” utility function that is a weakly separable function of all the first-level utility
functions; see Section 7.2 for further details.
The model of interdependent utilities that we study also connects with the social psychology literature
on empathy. Vasquez and Weretka (2018) argue that it captures the psychological phenomenon of
affective empathy and emotional contagion, to be contrasted with the notion of cognitive empathy,
which works through intentions and beliefs of others, as in Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989).
They also discuss the relationship with “material games,” where the interdependence is modeled through
material outcomes such as money or consumption.5
Here are four examples that illustrate the concept of interdependent utilities. We’ve deliberately chosen
them to illustrate situations other than the obvious ones of altruism or envy.
Example 1. Aspirations. For some collection of continuous return and cost functions tgiu and tciu,
ui “ gi pxi, aiq ´ cipxq,
where ai is the average value of uj over some reference group of individuals that influences i. To
interpret this, suppose that person i lives in a society in which she is influenced by the average payoff of
her reference group. She might observe their lifestyles and economic position, but in the example she
is moved, in the end, by how happy they are. The use of perceived or imagined happiness as reference
points is, in many cases, just as defensible as the use of “objective economic position.”
Think of this average payoff as an “aspiration” for person i, a reference point that affects her not just
intrinsically but instrumentally.6 That is, if xi is a costly investment in her own life, it will bring a return
g that is influenced — positively or negatively — by the aspiration she has. Apart from this “intrinsic
effect,” there will be an “instrumental effect” on her choice of xi — her aspirations might serve either to
5See Sobel (2005) for a survey.
6See, e.g., Ray (2006), Dalton, Ghosal and Mani (2016) and Genicot and Ray (2017).
6inspire or frustrate investment — the cross-partials of g will determine that outcome. The more general
point is that individual payoffs could be affected in this way by own actions and the payoffs of others.
Of course, assumptions on g will need to be placed to guarantee coherence and sub-coherence, such
as a contraction. Alternatively, if payoff functions are bounded and the associated directed network of
payoff interdependencies is acyclic, then coherence will hold automatically by a recursive argument.
Example 2. Industrialization. We borrow from the multiple equilibrium theory of industrialization in
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), and specifically invoke the baseline model of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
(1989). The players are n firms, each producing a distinct good. Each good can be produced by a
cottage technique y “ `, where ` is labor. This technique is available to a competitive fringe. Our firms
can also choose a “industrial technique” in each sector, where y “ α` ´ F for some α ą 1 and fixed
cost F ą 0. Each firm chooses a binary action: to industrialize or not.
Consumers have a utility function
ř
i lnpciq, and so spend their income equally on the n goods. The
demand curve for good i is therefore Di “ Y {npi, where Y is national income. National income, in
turn, equals wage income plus profit, which generates the payoff-based externality as follows. If m
firms industrialize, each limit-prices the fringe and therefore:
Y pmq “ m
„
1´ 1
α

Y pmq
n
´mF ` L,
where we’ve normalized wages to 1 and the labor force is L. We thus have the aggregate profits of
industrializing firms affecting national income and therefore the profit of every firm, so creating a
strategic complementarity in payoffs. It is easy to verify that coherence and sub-coherence are satisfied.
Example 3. Regulation. Again there are n firms, but this time the cross-firm externality will be nega-
tive. Each firm makes an investment xi to generate revenue rpxiq at cost cpxiq. Society (or a collective
regulator) receives a payoff γpuq from the vector u of firm payoffs, where γ is assumed to be continuous
and decreasing. A lower γ increases the chances of social animosity against the firms, and consequently
of a regulation placed on the firms, generating a penalty pipγq, where pi is continuous. The payoff for
each firm is therefore given by
ui “ fipxi, γq “ rpxiq ´ cpxiq ´ pipγq.
Notice how we define γ on the net payoff of each firm, with everything taken into account, including
the penalty. Our specification allows the regulator’s payoffs to decline with an individual firm’s overall
fortunes, thereby creating a potential externality imposed by one firm on all firms. Simple restrictions
on these functions will guarantee coherence and sub-coherence.
Example 4. A genuine game of love and hate? Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Player 2
x¯2 x2˚
Player 1 x¯1 c, c b, a
x1˚ a, b d, d
where a ą c ą d ą b. Intuitively, this is not a situation of payoff-based externalities. A player’s
payoff depends on the actions of her opponent and not on the payoff he derives from it. That said, it is
mathematically possible to embed this game within a strategic situation with payoff-based externalities.
7Consider any bounded continuous fi such that for i “ 1, 2,
fipx¯i, cq “ c, fipx¯i, aq “ b, fipxi˚ , bq “ a, fipxi˚ , dq “ d.
Of course, the function needs to be defined for all utility vectors but that isn’t a problem. As we shall
see below, though, such a representation must fail coherence or continuity. In other words, although the
prisoner’s dilemma can be made to fit the definition of a strategic situation with payoff-based externali-
ties, it does not result in a game of love and hate.
4. MAIN RESULT
Our main result is:
THEOREM 1. Every equilibrium of a game of love and hate is Pareto optimal.
Of course, externalities can result in inefficient outcomes or market failure. Game theory is replete with
such examples. It turns out that restricting externalities to be payoff-based, and assuming coherence as
well as sub-coherence, is enough to show that every equilibrium is efficient. Apart from these restric-
tions, we assume little else. We ask for the continuity of all payoffs in the payoffs of others. We allow
for both positive and negative externalities, or indeed both on different sub-regions of the domain. No
assumptions are made on payoffs as a function of own actions; indeed, there is no topological structure
on action sets. No assumption is made on the curvature of payoffs as a function of the payoffs of others.
The context in which this theorem might be easiest to understand is a situation with strategic com-
plementarities. Such is the case with Example 2, on “industrialization,” where the profits of one firm
positively affect those of other firms. But even in this “best-case scenario,” there may be multiple
Pareto-dominated equilibria as in any coordination game. And yet, as noted by Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny (1989), this particular example — or its competitive analogue, to be more exact — has a unique
equilibrium. The equilibrium is also efficient, which is an implication of our theorem. But our theorem
goes way beyond the complementarities in Example 2, and as already mentioned, it is independent of
the direction of the externalities. (But see Section 7.3 for more on the special case of positive external-
ities, or “love”.)
Perhaps the theorem is best appreciated by reading its proof in detail, but as the argument is long,
we provide the reader with a discussion and outline. Suppose that x˚ is an equilibrium, but it is not
Pareto-optimal. Then it is Pareto-dominated by some x¯ with u¯ “ Upx¯q, so that
(3) fpx¯, u¯q “ u¯ ą u˚.
At the same time, because x˚ is an equilibrium, it follows that
(4) ui˚ “ Uipx˚q ě Uipx¯i, x˚´ iq for all i,
because a unilateral deviation to x¯i from xi˚ cannot be profitable for i. A central observation (Lemma 1)
proves that the absence of a profitable deviation, as just described in (4), is equivalent to the absence of
a “naively profitable” deviation, in which player i deviates under the (possibly mistaken) premise that
other payoffs will not change — even though they generally will. That is, (4) is equivalent to
(5) u˚ “ fpx˚, u˚q ě fpx¯, u˚q.
8*
u1
u2
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FIGURE 1. Proof of Theorem 1 with Two Players.
With (3) and (5) in hand, we graphically illustrate the proof for n “ 2. Figure 1 draws the two functions
f1px¯1, u2q and f2px¯2, u2q, where the action vector is fixed throughout at x¯ “ px¯1, x¯2q. By boundedness,
all the action takes place in some compact rectangle. The inequality (3) is represented graphically by
the location of u¯ to the northeast of the utility vector u˚. Next, inequality (5) places one restriction
each on the functions f1 and f2. The function f1px¯1, u2q evaluated at u2 “ u2˚ must lie to the “left”
of u˚, and the function f2px¯2, u1q evaluated at u1 “ u1˚ must lie “below” u˚. But the former function
continues on and eventually hits the horizontal axis, while the latter must eventually hit the vertical axis.
By continuity, then, the two functions must cross at some u1 ‰ u¯. But now we have a contradiction to
the uniqueness of the interdependent utility system at x¯.
The argument generalizes beyond two-person games in other special cases. For instance, if the game
in question is one of “love,” so that all individual utilities are nondecreasing in the utilities of others,
a Tarski-style fixed point theorem reveals the existence of an additional fixed point to the “southwest”
of u˚. That, too, leads to a contradiction to the uniqueness of the interdependent utility system at x¯. It
should be noted that this “special case” is the central case of interest in Pearce (1983) and Bergstrom
(1999).
It is also possible to construct a direct argument in the case of “hate.”
But no direct analogue of this argument in the general case is possible in three or more dimensions.
For instance, with n “ 3, we can certainly depict inequalities (3) and (5) graphically, as we have just
done for two players. But there is no guarantee that an additional fixed point to fpx¯, .q, apart from u¯,
will exist, so that a contradiction can be established. Indeed, Example 7 will show exactly this, and that
sub-coherence will need to be invoked to go further. That necessitates a very different argument.
In the general case, we proceed by induction. We will establish the following claim, which is a bit
stronger than what we need, but is nevertheless the more convenient to prove, as we will need the
additional power to complete the inductive step.
9CLAIM. There is no profile x˚ with Upx˚q “ u˚ such that for some other action profile x¯ and utility
profile Upx¯q “ u¯,
(6) fpx¯, u¯q ě u¯ ą u˚ ě fpx¯, u˚q.
Theorem 1 follows from this Claim. Suppose that x˚ is an equilibrium, but it is not Pareto-optimal.
Then (3) and (5) hold for some x¯ ‰ x˚. But these together imply (6), which contradicts the Claim.
The remainder of the proof establishes the Claim using induction on n. Specifically, we show that if
(6) is true for a game with n players, where n ě 2, then we can find a game with a smaller number of
players where (6) is true as well. But it is very easy to see that for a single-person game, (6) must be
false. After all, for a one-person game, fpx¯, u¯q “ fpx¯, u˚q, simply because there are no other players.
Echoing the induction upwards as the number of players increases, we see that (6) can never be true.
This attempt to provide an intuitive argument for Theorem 1 does not adequately highlight the impor-
tance of coherence. In fact, as a reading of the formal proof will indicate, both parts of coherence
are needed for these arguments. Neither boundedness nor uniqueness can be dropped from Theorem
1 or Lemma 1, which connects profitable and naively profitable deviations. To see this in an explicit
example, modify the “unstable equilibrium” from Section 2, described in the discussion leading to (2).
Example 5. Unstable Hate. Let n “ 2, and suppose that both players hate each other:7
fipx, u´iq “ xi ´ 2u´i, for i “ 1, 2.
Let Xi “ r0, 1s, i “ 1.2. While boundedness fails, there is a unique solution:
ui “ ´1
3
xi ` 2
3
x´i, for i “ 1, 2.
Clearly, the unique equilibrium is x˚ “ p0, 0q, with u˚ “ upx˚q “ p0, 0q. Lemma 1 does not hold
because at x˚ if we keep u´i fixed at 0, player i has a naively profitable deviation to xi “ 1. And
Theorem 1 does not hold because x “ p1, 1q Pareto dominates x˚.
It is easy to see that if we modify this example to impose boundedness we will lose uniqueness. Thus,
neither part of coherence can be dropped from our main result. We will return to these matters from a
different perspective in Section 7.4.
5. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT
Let pN, tXi, Uiuq be a game of love and hate generated by some continuous, coherent and sub-coherent
strategic situation. Consider the reduced game resulting from the removal of some subset S of players,
with their payoffs pegged at uS . It has player set N ´ S, and payoff functions
f´Sj pxj , u´jq ” fjpxj , u´pSYjq, uSq,
for j P N ´S, where with some mild abuse of notation, the term u´j on the left-hand side is presumed
to exclude all players in S. (Notice that u´pSYjq may have no components left; after all, a single player
game would be induced if |S| “ n´ 1.) For every action profile x in the original game, sub-coherence
ensures a unique payoff profile in the reduced game; call it U´Spx, uSq. Note that U´Spx, uSq depends
only on xN´S and uS ; it is insensitive to xS . Because fipxi, .q is continuous for all i and xi, the
7We are grateful to Ted Bergstrom for constructing this example and the accompanying story. Hatfield and McCoy hate
each other intensely and derive pleasure from their own consumption of whiskey, which alas is bounded above by 1.
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fixed points of each reduced game are upper-hemicontinuous in uS . Uniqueness of the fixed point then
implies that for each x, U´Spx, uSq is continuous in uS .
A special reduced game is obtained by excluding just one player i with utility ui. For any action profile
x, then, the payoffs to N ´ tiu are given by the vector U´ipx, uiq. It will useful to introduce notation
that describes how U´ipx, uiq maps back to i’s payoff in the original game. That is, define
φipui, xq “ fipxi, U´ipx, uiqq.
In words, for a fixed action profile, we consider the reduced utility system that results when player i’s
utility is pegged at ui, extract the unique fixed point of that reduced system, and now evaluate player i’s
utility at her action choice xi when other players enjoy that fixed point. It follows from the continuity
of U´ipx, uiq in ui that φipui, xq is a continuous function of ui.
For any x, the fixed point of fpx, ¨q is closely related to that of φip¨, xq. Recall that Upxq is the unique
fixed point of fpx, ¨q. Because U´ipx, Uipxqq is the unique solution to the reduced system given x
and Uipxq, we have U´ipxq “ U´ipx, Uipxqq. Therefore φipUipxq, xq “ fipxi, U´ipx, Uipxqqq “
fipxi, U´ipxqq “ Uipxq; i.e., Uipxq is a fixed point of φip¨, xq. In fact it is the unique fixed point. For
if not, there is u˜i ‰ ui with u˜i “ φipu˜i, xq. Let u˜´i “ U´ipx, u˜iq. Then u˜ satisfies (1), but because
u˜i ‰ u¯i, this contradicts the uniqueness assumption. Thus, Upxq is a unique fixed point of fpx, ¨q if
and only if Uipxq is the unique fixed point of φip¨, xq for every i. The function φi will turn out to be
useful in checking equilibrium conditions.
A deviation by player i from x˚ to xi is profitable if Uipxi, x˚´ iq ą Uipx˚q. It is naively profitable if
fipxi, U´ipx˚qq ą fipxi˚ , U´ipx˚qq; i.e., player i profits under the “naive” presumption that all other
utilities will remain unchanged.
LEMMA 1. A unilateral deviation is profitable if and only if it is naively profitable.
Proof. For any pair of action profiles x1, x2 P X , let u1 “ Upx1q and u2 “ Upx2q. We claim that
(7) u1i ą u2i if and only if φipu2i , x1q ą φipu2i , x2q “ u2i .
To see why this is so, suppose φipu2i , x1q ą u2i ; see Figure 2A for an illustration. Since φip., x1q is
continuous and φipB, x1q ă B for B large (by boundedness), the intermediate value theorem tells us
that there is u˜i ą u2i with u˜i “ φipu˜i, x1q. Since φip¨, x1q has a unique fixed point, u˜i “ u1i, so u1i ą u2i .
Conversely, if φipu2i , x1q ď u2i (Figure 2B), then using the fact that φip´B, x1q ě ´B for B large
enough (by boundedness), we know that there is u˜i ď u2i such that u˜i “ φipu˜i, x1q. Since φip¨, x1q has
a unique fixed point, u˜i “ u1i, which implies u1i ď u2i , and so establishes (7).
Now suppose that i deviates from x˚ to xi. Let u˚ “ Upx˚q and y “ pxi, x˚´ iq. By (7),
(8) Uipyq “ Uipxi, x˚´ iq ą ui˚ if and only if φipui˚ , yq ą ui˚ .
Because U´ipx, uiq is insensitive to xi, and y´i “ x˚´ i, we have U´ipx, ui˚ q “ U´ipy, ui˚ q, so that
φipui˚ , yq “ fipxi, U´ipy, ui˚ qq “ fipxi, U´ipx, ui˚ qq “ fipxi, u˚´ iq.
Substituting this in (8) we have:
(9) Uipxi, x˚´ iq ą ui˚ if and only if fipxi, u˚´ iq ą ui˚ ,
which establishes the desired result.
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(A) φipu2i , x1q ą u2i
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450
ui = ui u′′i~ ′
(B) φipu2i , x1q ď u2i
FIGURE 2. A Step in the Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove the Claim described in Section 4 by induction on the number of
players. To begin the induction argument, consider any game with a single player: 1. Fix any action x1˚
with utility u1˚ . For any other action x¯, it is immediate that fpx¯, u¯q “ fpx¯, u˚q, because there are no
other players. So (6) can never hold.
Now for the inductive step. Suppose that the Claim is true of every game with m ă n players satisfying
the conditions of the theorem, where n ě 2. Consider a game with player set N , where |N | “ n.
Suppose, contrary to the Claim, that there are profiles x˚ and x¯, and payoff profiles u˚ and u¯, such that
(6) is satisfied. Now we consider the following two possibilities.
Case 1. There is some player, say k, such that in the reduced game without k (and with uk “ uk˚),
(10) U´kpx¯, uk˚q ą u˚´ k.
In this case, define S “ tku. In the reduced game with player set N ´ S, define ur ” U´kpx¯, uk˚q.
Then we have
(11) f´kpx¯, urq “ ur ą u˚´ k ě f´kpx¯, u˚´ kq
where the first equality is by definition of ur and the next inequality is from (10). The final weak in-
equality follows from two observations. First, the last weak inequality of (6) holds, by our contradiction
assumption. Second, in the reduced game k has been removed with utility level uk˚ , so f
´kpx¯, u˚´ kq is
fpx¯, u˚q restricted to N ´ k. But the reduced game satisfies all the conditions of the theorem, so that
(11) contradicts the induction hypothesis.
Case 2. For every k, (10) fails. Then it must be that u¯ " u˚. (For if not, Case 1 would hold for some k
such that u¯k “ uk˚ .) Pick any k. Then for for every j ­“ k,
(12) U´kj px¯, u¯kq “ u¯j ą uj˚ .
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Moreover, the fact that (10) fails implies that for some j ‰ k,
(13) U´kj px¯, uk˚q ď uj˚ .
Pick the largest value uˆk P ruk˚, u¯ks such that
(14) U´kj px¯, uˆkq “ uj˚ for some j ‰ k.
Since U´kpx¯, .q is continuous and (13) holds, uˆk is well defined. Moreover, given (12), it must be that
u¯k is not binding for uˆk:
(15) uk˚ ď uˆk ă u¯k.
Let S be the set of agents for whom (14) holds. Note that k R S (so S is a strict subset of N ), and if
some other i ‰ k is also not in S, then
(16) U´ki px¯, uˆkq ą ui˚ .
Consider the reduced game induced on players N ´ S by setting uS “ uS˚ . It has payoff functions
f´Si pxi, u´iq ” fipxi, u´pSYiq, uS˚q, for all i P N ´ S,
where we recall that u´i on the left-hand side excludes all players in S.
Consider the profile x¯ in the reduced game. Define a utility profile ur on N ´ S by
(17) uri “
"
uˆk for i “ k,
U´ki px¯, uˆkq for i ‰ k, i P N ´ S
We claim that in the reduced game,
(18) f´Spx¯, urq ě ur ě uN˚´S while f´Spx¯, urq ‰ ur or ur ‰ uN˚´S .
To this end, first note that if i P N ´ S and i ‰ k, (16) and (17) together imply that:
(19) uri “ U´ki px¯, uˆkq ą ui˚ for all i P N ´ S ´ k.
Next, by definition, U´kpx¯, uˆkq solves the interdependent utility system at x¯ with k removed, which
means in particular that for all i P N ´ S ´ k,
(20) U´ki px¯, uˆkq “ f´ki px¯, U´k´i px¯, uˆkqq
But U´kj px¯, uˆkq “ uj˚ for j P S and U´kj px¯, uˆkq “ urj for j P N ´ S ´ k, while urk “ uˆk; see (17).
Putting all this together with (20), we must conclude that
(21) uri “ f´Si px¯, ur´iq for all i P N ´ S ´ k.
Combining (19) and (21),
(22) f´Si pxi, ur´iq “ uri ą ui˚ for all i P N ´ S ´ k.
We now consider individual k. We first claim that
(23) φkpuˆk, x¯q ą uˆk.
For if (23) were false, then φkpuˆk, x¯q ď uˆk. Because φkp´B, x¯q ě ´B for B large enough and φk
is continuous, there exists u1k ď uˆk such that φipu1k, x¯q “ u1k. But that generates a utility solution
pu1k, U´kpx¯, u1kqq at the action profile x¯ of the original game. It is distinct from u¯ because u1k ď uˆk ă
u¯k, using (15). That violates coherence.
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Next, observe that
(24) φkpuˆk, x¯q “ fkpx¯, U´kpx¯, uˆkqq “ fkpx¯, urN´S´k, uS˚q “ f´Sk px¯, ur´kq,
where the first equality is just the definition of φk, the second equality follows from uS˚ “ U´kS px¯, uˆkq
(see (14)) and the definition of ur in (17), and the last equality is just the translation to the reduced game
where S is excluded with payoff uS˚ .
Combining (23) and (24) along with urk “ uˆk ě uk˚ (the equality is from (17) and the inequality from
(15)), we must conclude that
(25) f´Sk px¯k, ur´kq ą urk ě uk˚.
Combining (22) and (25), we obtain (18) for the reduced game, as claimed.
We now use (18) to prove that (6) holds for the reduced game. First, recall that by way of contradiction,
we’ve maintained that (6) holds for the original game, so that
ui˚ ě fipx¯i, u˚´ iq for all i P N ´ S.
Because ui “ ui˚ for all i P S, f´Si px¯i, u˚´ iq “ fipx¯i, u˚´ iq for all i P N ´ S. That implies
(26) ui˚ ě f´Si px¯, u˚´ iq for all i P N ´ S.
Now combine (18) and (26) to see that
(27) f´Spx¯, urq ě ur ě uN˚´S ě f´Spx¯, uN˚´Sq, with f´Spx¯, urq ‰ ur or ur ‰ uN˚´S (or both).
To obtain (6) from (27), we claim that ur ą uN˚´S . If not, then (given that (27) holds) it must be
that ur “ uN˚´S , and so f´Spx¯, urq ą ur. But ur “ uN˚´S , so that’s just the same as saying that
f´Spx¯, uN˚´Sq ą uN˚´S . That means the very last inequality in (27) cannot hold, a contradiction. So
ur ą uN˚´S , as claimed, and (6) holds for the reduced game.
Now, the reduced game of a coherent and sub-coherent game, with payoff functions continuous in
others’ payoffs, inherits all these just-named properties. But then, by the the induction hypothesis, (6)
cannot hold for that reduced game, a contradiction.
As already noted in Section 4, our Theorem follows from the Claim. Formally, suppose there is an
equilibrium x˚ Pareto dominated by x¯. Let u˚ “ Upx˚q and u¯ “ Upx¯q. Then
fpx¯, u¯q “ u¯ ą u˚ ě fpx¯, u˚q,
where the last inequality makes use of Lemma 1 and the fact that x˚ is an equilibrium. But this implies
(6), a contradiction.
6. EXISTENCE
Under what conditions does a game of love and hate possess a Nash equilibrium? One approach to
answering this question is to see when standard results apply, once the strategic situation has been
converted to the normal form. For instance, if for every i, Xi is non-empty, compact and convex subset
of a finite dimensional Euclidean space and Uip.q : śj Xj Ñ IR is continuous and quasi-concave in
xi, then the existence of an equilibrium is assured. But this is not satisfactory, because these conditions
on Ui should be derived from the primitives of a strategic situation with payoff-based externalities. We
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therefore directly examine the strategic situation. It turns out that this approach has the added advantage
of yielding an existence result for pure strategy equilibrium that is free of any convexity assumptions.
We assume that:
(A1.) For all i, Xi is a non-empty, compact subset of a topological space and fi : Xi ˆ IRN Ñ IR is a
continuous function in all its arguments.
We also strengthen boundedness to require a uniform bound for all x P X .
(A.2) There is B ă 8 such that for every x P X , ‖fpx, uq‖ ă ‖u‖ whenever ‖u‖ ą B, where ‖¨‖ is
the sup norm.
THEOREM 2. Suppose the strategic situation pN, tXi, fiuq is coherent, sub-coherent and satisfies (A.1)
and (A.2). Then the induced game of love and hate has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. GivenB as in (A.2), let B “ tu P IRN | ‖u‖ ď Bu. Because fi is continuous andXiˆB is com-
pact,Bi ” max fipxi, uq is well-defined for pxi, uq P XiˆB, for every i. LetC “ maxtB1, . . . Bn, Bu
and C “ tu P IRN | ‖u‖ ď Cu. By construction, the range of f lies in C for all u P B. Because C ě B,
(A.2) implies that the same is true for all u P C. So for all px, uq P X ˆ C, fpx, uq P C.
Let βi : C Ñ Xi be player i’s naive best response correspondence:
βipuq “ txi P Xi | fipxi, u´iq ě fipx1i, u´iq for all x1i P Xiu.
Given (A.1), Berge’s maximum theorem implies that for every i, βi is non-empty and upper hemicon-
tinuous and the maximum function, γi : C Ñ r´C,Cs, is continuous, where
γipuq “ tfipxi, u´iq | xi P βipu´iqu.
Since γ “ śi γi : C Ñ C is a continuous function, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, it has a fixed
point u˚. For every i, pick any xi˚ P βipu˚q. We claim that x˚ “ pxi˚ q is an equilibrium. Clearly,
Upx˚q “ fpx˚, u˚q “ u˚ and for every i, xi˚ is a naive best response to u˚´ i:
fipxi˚ , u˚´ iq ě fipxi, u˚´ iq for all xi P Xi.
From Lemma 1, the lack of a naively profitable deviation implies that no player has a profitable deviation
at x˚, i.e., x˚ is an equilibrium.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1. Some Intuition for Differentiable Games of Love and Hate. Assuming payoff functions to be
differentiable and quasi-concave makes it easier to elicit some intuition about why equilibria might be
Pareto optimal. The exposition that follows aims to do this, but is not meant to be rigorous or complete.
And by no means is it meant to be a substitute for the proof of our theorem, which follows a completely
different approach, relying only on the continuity of the payoff functions in other payoffs, and imposing
no curvature condition on payoffs or topological structure on actions.
Suppose that for all i, Uipxq is continuously differentiable in x and quasi-concave in xi. An equilibrium
can then be characterized in terms of the first order conditions for each player. Using the equivalence
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of profitable and naively profitable deviations for a coherent situation (Lemma 1), these conditions are:
(28)
Bfipxq
Bxi “ 0 for all i.
As we saw in Example 5, this condition may not characterize an equilibrium in the absence of coher-
ence. The intuition discussed below relies on (28) and therefore presumes coherence.
Now consider the problem of a social planner, who seeks to maximizeÿ
j
λjUjpxq
where λ ” pλ1, . . . , λnq1 is a system of nonnegative weights summing to unity. Assuming that the
relevant solutions are all interior, the first-order conditions are given byÿ
j
λj
BUjpxq
Bxi “ 0 for all i.
Collect this in matrix form to write
(29) Dxλ “ 0,
where Dx is the matrix of cross-effects
Dx “
¨˚
˚˝˚˚
BU1pxq
Bx1
BU2pxq
Bx1 . . .
BUnpxq
Bx1BU1pxq
Bx2
BU2pxq
Bx2 . . .
BUnpxq
Bx2
...
...
. . .
...
BU1pxq
Bxn
BU2pxq
Bxn . . .
BUnpxq
Bxn
‹˛‹‹‹‚
By the chain rule,
BUjpxq
Bxi “
ÿ
k
Bfj
Buk
BUkpxq
Bxi
for j ‰ i, and for j “ i:
BUipxq
Bxi “
Bfi
Bxi `
ÿ
k
Bfi
Buk
BUkpxq
Bxi ,
so that
(30) Dx “ F `DxDu,
where
F “
¨˚
˚˝˚˚
Bf1pxq
Bx1 0 . . . 0
0 Bf2pxqBx2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . BfnpxqBxn
‹˛‹‹‹‚ and Du “
¨˚
˚˝˚˚ Bf1Bu1 Bf2Bu1 . . . BfnBu1Bf1Bu2 Bf2Bu2 . . . BfnBu2
...
...
. . .
...
Bf1
Bun
Bf2
Bun . . .
Bfn
Bun
‹˛‹‹‹‚,
the latter written with the understanding that Bfi{Bui “ 0 for all i. Rewriting (30), we see that
(31) Dx “ F rI ´Dus´1,
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where the presumption that I´Du has an inverse is closely connected to coherence; see Pearce (1983).
Combining (29) and (31), we must conclude that the first order conditions for a solution to the planner’s
problem are
(32) F rI ´Dus´1λ “ 0.
We can open this out as follows. Let bij be a generic entry for the matrix rI ´ Dus´1; then (32) is
equivalent to the condition
(33)
„ Bfi
Bxi
« nÿ
j“1
bijλj
ff
“ 0 for all i.
Using (28), we see that a solution to the equilibrium first order conditions is also a solution to the
planner’s first order conditions (33), suggesting that equilibria are Pareto-optimal, or at least solve nec-
essary conditions for optimality. We reiterate: this is suggestive but incomplete, even with the coher-
ence, smoothness and curvature assumptions in place. Moreover, without coherence or sub-coherence,
Theorem 1 isn’t even generally true; see Examples 5 and 7. For more discussion, see the Appendix.
7.2. Connection with the First Theorem of Welfare Economics. There is a parallel between Theo-
rem 1 and the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics. In the latter setting, individual utilities
are defined on own consumption, but there is a potential externality: my consumption comes at the
expense of yours. That externality is mediated through the price system — an agent who consumes
more pays for it at precisely the rate of the marginal deprivation caused to others, and so behaves as if
she is socially responsible. The first welfare theorem states that the resulting outcome is efficient. In
contrast, there are no prices in Theorem 1, so there is no way to pay for the externalities. But the point
is that there are no externalities inflicted locally when an agent hits a maximum, because her payoff
is (locally) flat. As indicated in Section 7.1, this argument is far from complete, but in any case, our
theorem depends on the vanishing of the externality itself, without the assistance of prices.
These are distinct channels leading to a similar final outcome. To appreciate this distinctness, overlay
one model on the other, so that we have a setting with prices and with payoff-based externalities. Then
the resulting equilibrium is generally not Pareto-optimal. The reason is simple. If agents are benevolent,
they may well wish to allocate a larger part of the resources to some agent(s) than is feasible through
the market, given that wealth redistribution is not permitted. Indeed, as Winter (1969) and Bergstrom
(1970) observe, even allowing agents to unilaterally transfer wealth to others may not suffice to restore
the first welfare theorem. This literature does look for conditions for the first welfare theorem to hold
in the presence of externalities; see, e.g., Ledyard (1971), Osana (1972) and Parks (1991).8 It identifies
a form of “non-benevolence,” which is related to though not quite the same as the condition that all
externalities are negative, but the point is that no such restriction is needed for the analogous result in
this paper. (Here, it doesn’t matter whether agents are benevolent or malevolent toward some or all
opponents, or indeed whether they are affected in some non-monotone way by the payoffs of others.)
Theorem 1 is cast in the setting of strategic situations as opposed to competitive equilibrium. A central
difference is that in a game the feasible strategy profiles span the entire set of social outcomes whereas
in an exchange economy they don’t — specifically, agents cannot alter the wealth distribution. This
means that the planner in an exchange economy has an extra instrument compared to the agents, which
8We are grateful to Peter Hammond for alerting us to the existence of this literature.
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makes it harder for an equilibrium to satisfy Pareto optimality. While the first welfare theorem tells
us that this does not impede Pareto-optimality in the classical setting, it clearly matters when there are
externalities. On the other hand, in the game-theoretic model the planner doesn’t have the advantage of
an extra instrument. The game-theoretic analogue of the classical competitive setting is one in which
externalities are central, and efficiency routinely fails. The restriction to the subclass of payoff-based
externalities restores that efficiency, irrespective of the particular form of those externalities.
Of course, there is also a second welfare theorem for competitive equilibrium, and corresponding to that
we have the parallel question for games: might every Pareto optimum be a Nash equilibrium? In terms
of our first-order conditions, one might look for the reverse implication: “does (33) imply (28)?” This
is not a question we investigate here in any generality, though the Appendix contains a discussion.9
Some of this cited literature on welfare theorems avoids the coherence issue via a two-step procedure for
defining final payoffs. In Samuelson’s (1981) terminology, each consumer i has a “first-order” utility
function” wipxiq that depends only on i’s commodity bundle. Externalities are introduced through a
“second order” Bergsonian utility function:
Uipxq “ hipw1px1q, . . . , wnpxnqq.
Samuelson (1981) observes that one could consider a ”third order” utility function that depends on own
consumption and other’s second order utility functions, and so on. The logical conclusion of this idea is
to consider not some arbitrary, finite iteration but a steady-state in which conjectures about others’ utility
are accurate.10 In other words, require Ui to be a function of wipxiq and Uj ­“i, which is precisely the
model of interdependent utilities we have adopted. Under some conditions, Samuelson’s formulation
can be viewed as a special case of our framework.11
7.3. Love, Hate and the Shape of the Utility Possibility Frontier. Even though our theorem holds
for fully general patterns of love and hate, the special case of positive externalities or “love” has an
interesting structure. The corresponding utility possibility frontier has a single payoff profile, which
Pareto-dominates all other payoff profiles.12 By our main theorem, every equilibrium picks out this
unique payoff profile. (We reiterate that the result continues to be non-trivial even in this special case,
9With externalities, it may not be possible to decentralize every Pareto optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium (so
the second welfare theorem need not hold either). However, interesting connections can be identified when externalities are
payoff-based; see Winter (1969), Ledyard (1971), Osana (1972), Rader (1980) and Parks (1991).
10See also the discussion in Vasquez and Weretka (2018). Samuelson doesn’t pursue this line on the grounds that in the
end, if this process converges, each agent’s utility function will be a function of all the first-order functions anyway.
11This follows from the proof of the main result in Green (2003), who examines welfare criteria when agents have both
subjective preferences and objective interests, which leads naturally to a model of (ordinal) interdependent preferences. An
intermediate step in the proof of his main result provides conditions under which such preferences can be represented by means
of real-valued functions over the set of alternativesX , as follows. For each agent there is a functionUi : X Ñ IR, representing
subjective preferences, and another function w:X Ñ IR, representing objective interests, where Uipxq “ řnj“1 αijwjpxq `
ai. This is his condition (16), which formally corresponds to the additively separable form of the individualistic Bergsonian
form stated above. Green shows that under his assumptions, this can be expressed as Uipxq “ wipxq `řj ­“i δijUjpxq ` bi,
which is, of course, the additive form of the model of interdependent preferences we are studying.
12This is to be contrasted with the case of an exchange economy, where xi refers to i’s consumption rather than action,
and aggregate consumption is required to equal aggregate endowment. In that model, even with “universal love”, the utility
possibility frontier can have the usual shape; see the Romeo and Juliet example in Bergstrom (1989).
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as games of common or even identical interests could exhibit coordination failures in general, whereas
here they don’t.)
To see why this assertion is true, assume in what follows that for every i, fipxi, u´iq is nondecreasing
in u´i. Consider any two distinct payoff profiles u and u1, and let x and x1 be two corresponding action
profiles with these payoffs. Define an action profile x2 by setting x2i to i’s action under the action profile
with the higher payoff profile. Define a utility profile uˆ by uˆi “ maxtui, u1iu for all i. Now pick any i
and suppose without loss of generality that x2i “ xi. Observe that
fipx2i , uˆ´iq “ fipxi, uˆ´iq ě fipxi, u´iq “ ui “ maxtui, u1iu “ uˆi,
and by boundedness and Tarski’s fixed point theorem, the unique fixed point for utilities at the action
profile x2 — call it u2 — must weakly dominate uˆ. But uˆ in turn weakly dominates both u and u2. This
proves that the utility possibility frontier in a strategic situation of love must consist of a unique payoff
profile. The Appendix includes a simple example to illustrate this point.
In strategic situations with “universal hate,” and a fortiori in “mixed situations,” the utility possibility
frontier looks more conventional, with nontrivial segments. Moreover, as already noted, the set of
equilibria may not fully cover such frontiers. The Appendix contains a more detailed discussion.
7.4. The Role Played by Coherence. In Pearce (1983), Hori and Kanaya (1989), Bergstrom (1999),
and Vasquez and Weretka (2018), there is a concern with explosive or multiple utility representations.
That concern is often at some philosophical level: “should” utility representations explode? (no: bound
them — as in Vasquez and Weretka 2018), or: “should” utility representations exhibit the wrong com-
parative statics? (no: find a conditions that guarantee uniqueness — as in Pearce 1983, Hori and Kanaya
1989 or Bergstrom 1999). In short, the coherence of any strategic situation with payoff-based external-
ities has intrinsic appeal.
The purpose of this section is to argue that coherence plays a more subtle role, which is related to the
intuitive appropriateness of the love-hate representation for certain classes of games. To understand
this, begin with a standard game in normal form. We will now assume that the strategy spaces Xi are
compact for every i, and that the payoff function Ui : X Ñ IR — now to be thought of as the primitive
— is continuous in the product topology on X . We will say that such a game is regular if for every
player i and action xi P Xi, and for every pair of action profiles x´i and x1´ i for the other players,
Uipxi, x´iq ‰ Uipxi, x1´ iq implies U´ipxi, x´iq ‰ U´ipxi, x1´ iq.
This is a mild restriction, stating that if player i is sensitive to some change in the actions of others, then
so is at least one other player. It is easy to see that if this condition doesn’t hold it may be impossible to
express a normal form game as a situation with payoff-based externalities. But if it does hold, we have:
THEOREM 3. Every regular game with continuous payoffs can be represented as a continuous strategic
situation with payoff-based externalities.
We relegate the formal proof to the Appendix, but it is easy to see the argument. For player i, and action
xi, let U´i be the compact set of utility profiles u´i of the other players, such that u´i “ U´ipxi, x´iq
for some action profile x´i. Define a function fi on xi and this sub-domain U´i by
fipxi, u´iq “ Uipxi, x´iq,
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where x´i is any action profile such that u´i “ U´ipxi, x´iq. The exact choice of x´i is unimportant,
by regularity, but it should also be clear at this step that regularity is needed. The Appendix verifies the
continuity of fi on U´i, and a standard extension argument extends fi for every i and xi to all opponent
utility profiles on IRn´1.
But equilibrium inefficiency is rife among games in general. How can Theorem 1 be reconciled with
Theorem 3? The answer is that either coherence or sub-coherence must fail for any continuous repre-
sentation as a strategic situation, whenever the game has an inefficient equilibrium.13 We alluded to this
already in Example 4. To explain further, consider a 2ˆ 2 family of regular symmetric games:
Player 2
x¯2 x2˚
Player 1 x¯1 c, c b, a
x1˚ a, b d, d
To cut down on the number of cases, suppose that a, b, c, d are all distinct numbers. Suppose x˚ “
px1˚ , x2˚q is a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto dominated by x “ px¯1, x¯2q. This means that
(34) c ą d ą b.
Two cases of particular interest for us are (i) a prisoner’s dilemma, in which a ą c, so that the unique
equilibrium is the Pareto-inferior outcome x˚ with payoffs pd, dq; and (ii) a coordination game, in which
c ą a so that x˚ and x are both equilibria, the former Pareto-dominated.
Both cases yield inefficient equilibria. But these games are regular (and trivially continuous), and so
have continuous representations as strategic situations with payoff-based externalities. Because sub-
coherence holds trivially in a strategic situation with two players, it follows from Theorem 1 that no
such representation can be coherent. It is instructive to directly verify this assertion. To this end, let
tf1, f2u be a continuous representation of our two-player game as a strategic situation. Without any
loss of generality, we can choose any bounded continuous tfiu such that for i “ 1, 2,
fipx¯i, cq “ c, fipx¯i, aq “ b, fipxi˚ , bq “ a, and fipxi˚ , dq “ d.
Then, even though f1px¯1, dq is not pinned down by the payoff matrix, Lemma 1 and the fact that x˚ is
an equilibrium (which is implied by b ă d, as assumed in (34)) imply:
(35) f1px¯1, dq ď d.
Given the continuity of f1, (35) and f1px¯1,´mq ě m for large m (coherence) together imply, by the
intermediate value theorem, that there is e ď d such that f1px¯1, eq “ e. By symmetry, f2px¯2, eq “ e
as well. The uniqueness of the payoffs at x¯ must then mean that e “ c. Because e ď d and c ‰ d, this
implies that c ă d, which contradicts (34). (As we shall see in Example 6, however, coherence can be
restored if the representing payoff functions are allowed to be discontinuous.)
13Recall that coherence asks for a unique vector of utilities at every action profile, given the payoff functions fi. That is,
it is not asking for the demanding — and unreasonable — restriction that there should be just one set of representing payoff
functions, but only that there be one set of payoff numbers (per profile), given the representation.
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7.5. Is Coherence Alone Sufficient for Theorem 1? Theorem 3 in Section 7.4 shows that coherence
cannot be dropped from the statement of Theorem 1. For instance, the prisoner’s dilemma can be
transformed into a strategic situation with payoff-based externalities. Because sub-coherence holds
trivially for two-person strategic situations, any such transformation must lack coherence.
But a game of love and hate relies on two further restrictions. First, it assumes that payoff functions are
continuous in the payoffs of others. Second, it assumes that the game in question is not only coherent,
it is sub-coherent. In this Section, we argue that neither restriction can be dropped free of charge.
Example 6. The need for continuity. Consider a Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Player 2
x¯2 x2˚
Player 1 x¯1 3, 3 1, 4
x1˚ 4, 1 2, 2
It is easy to verify that this normal form is generated by the following strategic situation with pure
payoff-based externalities:
fipxi˚ , ujq “
"
6´ 2uj if uj ď 3
3 if uj ą 3
fipx¯i, ujq “
"
9´ 2uj if uj ď 4.5
4.5 if uj ą 4.5
for i, j “ 1, 2 and j ­“ i. We now verify that this situation is coherent, which (given just two players)
implies that it is also sub-coherent. Begin with the profile x “ px1˚ , x2˚q. If uj ą 3, then ui “
fipxi˚ , ujq “ 3. But then uj “ fjpxj˚ , uiq “ 0, a contradiction. Therefore uj ď 3, so that ui “ 6´ 2uj
for i, j “ 1, 2 and j ‰ i, the unique solution to which is u1 “ u2 “ 2. By a similar argument,
Upx¯2, x¯2q “ p3, 3q. Finally, consider pxi˚ , x¯jq. If uj ą 3, ui “ fipxi˚ , ujq “ 3, which implies that
uj “ fjpx¯j , , uiq “ 3, a contradiction. So uj ď 3. By a similar argument, ui ď 4.5. Together, these
imply ui “ 6 ´ 2uj and uj “ 9 ´ 2ui, or Upxi˚ , x¯jq “ p4, 1q. That completes the verification of
coherence. Of course, these functions are discontinuous, a property necessitated by Theorem 1.
While we often view continuity as a mere technical device, here it emerges as having real conceptual
power. The prisoner’s dilemma is not, intuitively, a strategic situation with payoff based externalities.
Yet it mathematically can be straitjacketed into one. If we attempt that straitjacketing with continuous
payoff functions, then (as already seen) coherence must fail. This example shows that one can also
impose coherence, but then continuity must fail. That failure is not a technicality. Indeed, as a parallel to
Theorem 3, one could also ask if every regular game has a love-hate representation satisfying coherence
and sub-coherence, if one is willing to sacrifice continuity. We do not pursue this question here.
Example 7. The necessity of sub-coherence. To show that sub-coherence cannot be dropped from
Theorem 1, we construct a continuous and coherent strategic situation with an inefficient equilibrium.
Our example will have three players (with two, sub-coherence is satisfied trivially). Let Xi “ txi˚ , x¯iu
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FIGURE 3. Verifying coherence at the strategy profile x¯ in Example 7.
for i “ 1, 2, X3 “ tx3u. Define the following payoff functions on r0, 1s2 with range in r0, 1s:14
f1px1˚ , u2, u3q “
$&% 0.95 if u2 ď 0.695pu2 ´ 0.7q2 if 0.6 ď u2 ď 0.7
0 if u2 ě 0.7
(36)
f1px¯1, u2, u3q “ u3(37)
f2px2˚ , u1, u3q “ 0.5 for all pu1, u3q(38)
f2px¯2, u1, u3q “
«
u
1{p1`u1q
3
1` u1{p1`u1q3
` 0.4` 0.1
b
2u1 ´ u21
ff2`2u1
(39)
f3px3, u1, u2q “ u1`u12(40)
Let x˚ ” px1˚ , x2˚q and x¯ ” px¯1, x¯2q. (Player 3 has only one strategy, so we don’t need to take note of
this.) We make the following three claims.
Claim 1. The strategic situation is coherent, and payoff functions are continuous in others’ payoffs.
Claim 2. x˚ is an equilibrium that is Pareto dominated by x¯: Upx¯q " Upx˚q.
Claim 3. Sub-coherence fails (as implied by Theorem 1 and the previous two Claims).
Proof of Claim 1. Continuity is immediate on inspecting (36)–(40). To prove coherence we need to
show that for any strategy profile x, fpx, .q has a unique fixed point.
Consider the strategy profile x˚. In this case Upx˚qmust satisfy (36), (38) and (40). It’s easy to see that
these equations have the unique solution Upx˚q “ p0.95, 0.5, 0.51.95q.
14It is trivial to continuously extend these functions to all of IR2, keeping them always in the range r0, 1s. Therefore our
assertions of coherence below will remain unaffected by this extension.
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Next, consider the strategy profile x¯. Suppose u is a fixed point of fpx¯, .q. Eliminating u3 from (37),
(39) and (40) we have:
u1 “ u1`u12 and u2 “
«
u
1{p1`u1q
1
1` u1{p1`u1q1
` 0.4` 0.1
b
2u1 ´ u21
ff2`2u1
,
so that
(41)
«
u
1{p1`u1q
1
1` u1{p1`u1q1
` 0.4` 0.1
b
2u1 ´ u21
ff2`2u1
´ u1{p1`u1q1 “ 0.
One solution to this is clearly u1 “ 1. Moreover, as Figure 3 (plotted using Mathematica) shows, the
left hand side of this equation is strictly positive for all u1 ă 1; see Panel A. The unique fixed point of
fpx¯, .q is therefore Upx¯q “ p1, 1, 1q. Further verification can be provided by examining the derivative
of this function to the left of 1; see Panel B in Figure 3.
There are two remaining cases to consider. In the first of them, x1 “ x¯1 and x2 “ x2˚ . Then u1 “
0.51`u1 . The function gpu1q “ 0.51`u1 ´ u1 is strictly decreasing in u1. Moreover, gp0q ą 0 and
gp1q ă 0, which implies that gpu1q “ 0 has a unique solution strictly between between 0 and 1. The
accompanying values of u2 and u3 are obviously unique.
In the second case, x1 “ x1˚ and x2 “ x¯2. In this case the relevant equations are (36), (39) and (40).
Substituting (36) and (40) into (39) we have„
u2
1` u2 ` 0.4` 0.1
b
2u1 ´ u21
2`2u1
´ u2 “ 0
Given (36), there are three distinct possibilities, depending on whether u2 P r0, 0.6s, u2 P p0.6.0.7q or
u2 P r0.7, 1s. The Appendix shows that the only solution is one that corresponds to the first case:
(42)
„
u2
1` u2 ` 0.4` 0.1
a
1.9´ .952
3.9
´ u2 “ 0 with u2 ď 0.6
Panel A of Figure 4 (again plotted using Mathematica) depicts the left hand side of (42). It shows that
fpx, .q has a unique fixed point and completes the proof of Claim 1.
Proof of Claim 2. Recall that Upx˚q “ p0.95, 0.5, 0.51.95q and Upx¯q “ p1, 1, 1q. To see that x˚ is
an equilibrium, we verify that U1px¯1, x2˚q ď u1˚ “ 0.95 and U2px1˚ , x¯2q ď u2˚ “ 0.5. The inequality
follows from the fact that U1px¯1, x2˚q is the solution to 0.51`u1 “ u1, as we saw in the proof of Claim
1. It is easy to see that the solution is strictly less than 0.95. For the latter, observe that U2px1˚ , x¯2q is
the (unique) solution to (42). As Panel A of Figure 4 shows, that solution is strictly less than 0.5.
Proof of Claim 3. By Theorem 1, sub-coherence fails. Consider the reduced game f´t1u with players
2 and 3, and u1 “ 0.95. Let x2 “ x¯2. A fixed point of f´t1u is equivalent to a solution of (42), but with
u2 P r0, 1s rather than in r0, 0.6s. And there are three solutions to this equation for u2 P r0, 1s as Panel
B of Figure 4 shows. The only difference between the two panels is that in [B], the range of u2 is r0, 1s
rather than r0, 0.6s. There is indeed a unique solution to the full utility system at px1˚ , x¯2q, but not when
the utility of player 1 is fixed at U1px˚q “ 0.95.
In fact, it follows from the proof of our theorem that if an equilibrium x˚ is Pareto dominated by x¯, then
there must exist a reduced game in which the player(s) that have been removed get Upx˚q, the others
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FIGURE 4. More on coherence and sub-coherence in Example 7.
play x¯, and the reduced game is not coherent. In the current example this is the case for the reduced
game with player 1’s payoff fixed at u1˚ . We leave it to the reader to verify that in this example this
feature does not hold for a reduced game in which one of the other players is removed.
7.6. Coherence: An Afterword. Theorem 1, as well as the subsequent discussion centered on Theo-
rem 3, tells us that a lot is hidden under the coherence rug. By no means do we suggest that coherence
is a universally desirable property. It is desirable only if we believe that the situation at hand is truly
a game with payoff-based externalities — as in Examples 1, 2 and 3 — and that too, not always.15
What we can say is that in the wider world, replete with inefficient Nash equilibria, the imposition of
coherence on the payoff-based representation may be inappropriate. In summary, whether coherence
is a “good” condition or not is deeply contextual. If our starting point is that the strategic situation is
genuinely one of payoff-based externalities, coherence can be defended (as Pearce and Bergstrom do).
If, on the other hand, the starting point is a standard normal-form game which has been straitjacketed
into a strategic situation with payoff-based externalities — via Theorem 3 — then coherence is a far
stronger presumption.
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APPENDIX
A. More on Differentiable Games, Pareto Optima and Equilibria. Section 7.1 of the main text recorded
necessary (and under quasi-concavity, sufficient) conditions for equilibrium, taking advantage of smoothness and
coherence:
(43)
Bfipxq
Bxi “ 0 for all i.
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We then considered the problem of a social planner, who seeks to maximizeÿ
j
λjUjpxq
where λ ” pλ1, . . . , λnq1 is a system of nonnegative weights summing to unity. Assuming the solution is interior,
the first-order conditions are described as follows. Let bij be a generic entry for the matrix rI ´Dus´1; then:
(44)
„ Bfi
Bxi
« nÿ
j“1
bijλj
ff
“ 0 for all i.
Equation (44) has the flavor of a complementary slackness condition. To understand it, note that bij can be inter-
preted as the direct and indirect effects of a change in player i’s utility on that of player j, with the direct effects
(summarized by Bfj{Bui) and all indirect effects (echoing through the “utility matrix”) factored in. Condition
(44) says that as long as this weighted sum of direct and indirect effects is nonzero — as we change the utility of
player i by varying her action — we should have player i at a stationary point in her own action at the planner
optimum (Bfi{Bxi “ 0). On the other hand, if the former weighted sum hits a zero somewhere, the planner might
need to prevent player i from maximizing her utility through her own choice of action.
Using (43), we concluded that the equilibrium conditions are also solutions to the planner’s first-order conditions
(44), suggesting that equilibria solve necessary conditions for planner optimality. That raises the question:
(a) Are the second order conditions for the planner’s problem satisfied, so that (44) characterizes all the (local)
optima for the planner’s problem?
One might also ask the reverse question: are all Pareto optima in a game of love and hate supportable as equilibria?
In terms of first-order conditions, that would be related to:
(b) Does (44) imply (43)?
In general, the answer to both questions could be negative (even assuming coherence), as our next example
illustrates.
First, the answer to (a) may be negative because the planner’s objective may not be concave in every xi even
when, for all i, Uip.q is concave in xi. As we shall see in Example A.1 below, for some weights λ it may be
convex in some xi, which means that (44) may not even describe a local optimum to the planner’s problem.
This illustrates the difficulties of a “differential approach” even when the primitive functions are well-behaved.
Because the quasiconcavity of the planner’s objective function is not guaranteed we cannot use the fact that (43)
implies (44) to argue that an equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
Second, and now moving in the reverse direction, even if (44) holds at a Pareto optimum, it may not imply (43),
because it’s possible that
řn
j“1 bijλj “ 0 for some i. Given our assumption that Uip.q is quasi-concave in xi
for all i, this implies that the Pareto optimum in question is not an equilibrium. In this situation, the optimal xi
imposes a zero marginal effect on the planner’s payoff, which could lead to a possible suppression of the best
response of agent i.
Example A.1. A game of love and hate with Pareto-optima that are not equilibria. Consider a two-person
strategic situation in which X1 “ X2 “ r0, 1s, and each player’s payoff is strictly concave in her own action and
decreasing in the other player’s payoff.
f1px1, u2q “1.5´ 1.5p0.5´ x1q2 ´ 0.5u2
f2px2, u1q “1.5´ 1.5p0.5´ x2q2 ´ 0.5u1.
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FIGURE 5. Pareto frontier for Example A.1.
This situation is coherent (and trivially sub-coherent). For each x P X1 ˆX2,
U1pxq “1´ 2p0.5´ x1q2 ` p0.5´ x2q2
U2pxq “1´ 2p0.5´ x2q2 ` p0.5´ x1q2
The unique equilibrium is x˚ “ p0.5, 0.5q, with payoff profile u˚ “ p1, 1q. The planner’s problem, given
λ “ pλ1, λ2q where λi P r0, 1s and λ1 ` λ2 “ 1, is:
max
xPX1ˆX2
λ1U1pxq ` λ2U2pxq.
Substituting for Uipxq, the planner objective function is λ1r1 ´ 2p0.5 ´ x1q2 ` p0.5 ´ x2q2s ` λ2r1 ´ 2p0.5 ´
x1q2 ` p0.5´ x2q2s which can be rewritten as:
(45) 1` pλ2 ´ 2λ1qp0.5´ x1q2 ` pλ1 ´ 2λ2qp0.5´ x2q2.
If λ P p1{3, 2{3q, the coefficients for p0.5´ x1q2 and p0.5´ x2q2 are both negative, (45) is strictly concave in x,
and the unique solution to maximizing (45) is x˚ “ p0.5, 0.5q. For λ in this range the answer to both (a) and (b)
is in the affirmative. If λ1 “ 1{3 the planner’s welfare is independent of x1 and optimality is consistent with any
x1 P r0, 1s, while x2 “ 0.5. This corresponds to b11λ1 ` b12λ2 “ 0 in (44), and the answer to (b) is negative:
(44) does not imply (43).16 Of course, the players’ utilities do depend on x1. The case λ1 “ 2{3 is symmetric.
If λ1 ă 1{3, the planner’s objective function, (45), becomes convex in x1. If λ ą 2{3 it becomes convex in x2. In
either case, (44) is not consistent with the maximization of the planner’s objective, (45). Of course, x˚ continues
to satisfy these conditions but is not a solution to the planner’s problem for λ1 R r1{3, 2{3s.
The utility possibility frontier can be shown to have the form
u2 “
"
1.5´ 0.5u1 if u1 ď 1
3´ 2u1 otherwise
and is depicted in Figure 5. There is only one utility profile on the Pareto frontier, u˚, that matches the equilibrium
utility profile Upx˚q “ p1, 1q. It is a solution to the planner’s problem for λ P r1{3, 2{3s. For λ not in this range,
(44) does not describe a solution to the planner’s problem. Moreover, every solution to the planner’s problem
requires that one of the players must be made to choose an action that is sub-optimal.
16It can be shown that pb11, b12q “ p4{3,´2{3q.
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FIGURE 6. Verifying coherence at the strategy profile x¯ in Example 7.
We know from Section 7.3 that this conventional shape of the utility possibility frontier is not possible in the case
of positive externalities. To see this, modify Example A.1 as follows:
f1px1, u2q “1.5´ 1.5p0.5´ x1q2 ` 0.5u2
f2px2, u1q “1.5´ 1.5p0.5´ x2q2 ` 0.5u1
which yields
U1pxq “3´ 2p0.5´ x1q2 ´ p0.5´ x2q2
U2pxq “3´ 2p0.5´ x2q2 ´ p0.5´ x1q2
Now, whatever the weights, λ1, λ2, there is a unique solution to the planner’s problem, namely x “ p0.5, 0.5q,
and only one point on the utility possibility frontier, u “ p3, 3q, confirming the general point made in Section 7.3.
We return to a discussion of the connections between the welfare theorems of general equilibrium, and our
results. This time our focus is on the second welfare theorem. That second theorem is related to question (b).
With differentiability, it can be phrased as a comparison of two first-order conditions: “does (44) imply (43)?” As
we saw in Example A.1, in general the answer is negative, though not so if all agents are non-malevolent, as we
know from Section 7.3. Relatedly, Winter (1969) shows that if no consumer is malevolent, then the second welfare
theorem holds:17 every Pareto optimal allocation is sustainable as a competitive equilibrium with redistribution.18
It is therefore possible that the second welfare theorem exhibits a closer parallel across games and competitive
equilibrium, though this paper is not about the second welfare theorem or its analogue in game theory.
B. Proof of Theorem 3. For each player i, and action xi, define compact U´i and fipxi, ¨q on U´i as in the
main text. Let um´i be a sequence of utility profiles in U´i converging to some u´i P U´i. Let xm´i be some
corresponding sequence of action profiles. By compactness, all the limit points of xm´i are bonafide action profiles,
and by regularity, Uipxi, x´iq “ Uipxi, x1´ iq for any possible pair of limit points px´i, x1´ iq. It follows that
fipxi, um´iq Ñ fipxi, u´iq, so fipxi, ¨q is continuous on U´i. By the Tietze extension theorem (see, for example,
Willard 1970, p. 99), fipx,¨q can be extended to a bounded continuous function on IRn´1.
17See also Rader (1980) and Parks (1991).
18In passing, take note of the tension between the conditions for each welfare theorem. While non-malevolence restores
the second welfare theorem, it is non-benevolence that appears to help with the first welfare theorem. Asking for both these
conditions to hold is to rule out externalities altogether; see Remark 8 in Parks (1991).
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C. Missing Details for Claim 2 in Example 7. The only detail for Example 7 that we need to supply is from
Claim 2. This is the demonstration that Upxq is unique when x “ px1˚ , x¯2q. As we showed in the main text, this
requires us to show that there is a unique solution to:„
u2
1` u2 ` 0.4` 0.1
b
2u1 ´ u21
2`2u1
´ u2 “ 0
According to (36), substituting for u1 in this equation gives us three distinct possibilities:
(46)
„
u2
1` u2 ` 0.4` 0.1
a
1.9´ .952
3.9
´ u2 “ 0 with u2 ď 0.6
(47)
„
u2
1` u2 ` 0.4` 0.1
?
95pu2 ´ 0.7q
a
2´ 95pu2 ´ 0.7q2
2`190pu2´0.7q2
´ u2 “ 0 with 0.6 ă u2 ă 0.7
or
(48)
„
u2
1` u2 ` 0.4
2
´ u2 “ 0 with u2 ě 0.7
Only the graph of the left hand side of (46) was shown in the main text. Figure 6 plots all three equations. Clearly,
only (46) has a solution. This shows that fpx, .q has a unique fixed point and completes the proof of Claim 2.
